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Describing and explaining are two very different 
engagements, and yet development experts routinely 
write as though to describe were to explain. If this were 
not the case, it would be hard to understand why they 
have found it necessary to repeatedly describe the lives 
of the world’s poorest over the past 30 years. Consider 
the following sentence constructed from numerous 
writings—for example, by Banerjee and Duflo, Narayan, 
the United Nations Development Programme, and the 
World Bank (see the “For Further Reading” for 
details)—wherein poverty is defined as a state of affairs 
where someone has access to very little income: 
In the world of the poor, people don’t enjoy food 
security, don’t own many assets, are stunted and 
wasted, don’t live long, can’t read or write, don’t 
have access to easy credit, are unable to save 
much, aren’t empowered, can’t insure themselves 
well against crop failure or household calamity, 
don’t have control over their own lives, don’t trade 
with the rest of the world, live in unhealthy 
surroundings, suffer from “incapabilities,” and are 
poorly governed. 
Let’s call the above passage Description. Although 
no one would have ever doubted its validity, it offers 
little guidance for action. It doesn’t say what is a cause 
and what is an effect; it doesn’t distinguish between 
proximate and deep causes; it doesn’t say what is a 
variable and what is a parameter in the environment in 
which the poor reside; and it doesn’t say whether those 
that are variables can be interpreted in samples to 
“move” together over time (time-series data) or across 
parameter values at a given time (cross-sectional data). 
Above all, the passage doesn’t help to identify the 
pathways that lead to the state of affairs where 
Description holds. And, yet, an enormous literature has 
drawn on Description to arrive directly at policy 
prescriptions. It seems that even the Millennium 
Development Goals and the United Nations’ plans for 
meeting them reflect this methodological stance.  
Despite its length, Description omits at least two 
items: the sentence should have continued on to say 
that the poor suffer from a deteriorating natural 
resource base and high birth rates. These points are 
kept out of Description because neither reproductive 
behavior nor the local natural resource base has been 
of much interest to contemporary development experts, 
an issue that will be discussed later in this brief. 
Multiple Causations of Poverty 
Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence 
show that the persistence of poverty in a world of 
economic progress elsewhere should be traced to 
socioeconomic, metabolic, and ecological processes 
involving positive feedback. In mathematically simple 
systems, the positive feedback may be a reflection of 
fixed costs. For example, maintenance costs in 
human metabolic processes are substantial, as are 
overhead costs in running a household in a world 
where water cannot be obtained from turning on a 
tap, where energy is not available at the flick of a 
switch, and where cooking is a vertically integrated 
activity, meaning that all the ingredients are in their 
rawest form. In more complicated systems, positive 
feedback is a feature of complementarities among 
the drivers of the processes in question. For 
example, primary education, nutritional intake, and 
health care are complementary inputs in child 
development. Remove one input, and the child does 
not develop much. The shadow value of a service is 
negligible if its complements are unavailable. For 
example, when a child is undernourished, the value 
of education to her is low, because an under-
nourished child is unable to imbibe much knowledge 
and skills. Of course, fixed costs themselves could be 
manifestations of complementarities among the 
drivers of the systems in question, the point being 
that if you peer into the microfoundations of a 
process, you may discover that complementarities 
among the various drivers give rise to those fixed 
costs. 
One implication of positive feedback is that, in the 
world of the poor, each item in Description reinforces 
the others, implying that the productivity of labor effort, 
ideas, manufactured capital, and land and natural 
resources are all very low and remain low. The lives of 
poor people are filled with problems each day. In 
contrast, the rich suffer from no such deprivation. 
People in the rich world face what today are called 
challenges. An implication of the positive feedback 
alluded to here is that in the world of the rich, the 
productivity of labor effort, ideas, manufactured capital, 
and land and natural resources is all very high and 
continually increasing. Success in meeting each 
challenge reinforces the prospects of success in 
meeting further challenges. Since the aim of this brief is 
to stimulate discussion, the theory and empirics of 
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poverty traps are not reproduced here. Instead, 
extrapolating the logic of positive feedback, the 
discussion shows how some people can get trapped in 
poverty, while others—not dissimilar to them—are 
able to escape and prosper. The brief thus follows two 
parallel expository routes: an informal account and 
formal modeling approaches presented in Boxes 1 
through 3 at the end of the brief. 
Even though Description suggests the 
phenomenon of multiple causation, the temptation to 
seek monocausal explanations for the twin presence 
of poverty and wealth in our world is so powerful that 
even development experts have not always been able 
to overcome it. But the presence of mutual causation 
(namely, several variables influencing one another 
over time) has implications for interpreting data. The 
phenomenon is displayed in a simple deterministic 
model (Box 1). The model contains several economic 
variables that influence one another over time. In fact, 
of course, people’s lives involve and feed into many 
processes. One process, creating metabolic pathways, 
works at the level of the individual. Those pathways 
are based on physiological links connecting (a) under-
nourishment and a person’s vulnerability to infectious 
diseases, (b) nutritional status and work capacity 
among adults, and (c) nutritional status and physical 
and mental development among children. The ways 
those pathways can harbor poverty traps is sketched 
in the section “Nutrition, Health, and Human 
Productivity,” below, and modeled in Box 2. 
A second category of processes, operating at a 
spatially localized level, is site specific. It involves a 
combination of ecological and socioeconomic 
pathways, giving rise to reproductive and 
environmental externalities. In contrast to modern 
macroeconomic growth models, these processes are 
influenced by the local ecology. The theory based on 
them acknowledges that the economic options open 
to a poor community in, say, the African savanna are 
different from those available to people in the 
Gangetic Plain of India. Although policies and 
institutions shape the forces people face, the local 
ecology shapes them too. Among ecological and 
socioeconomic pathways, some involve positive 
feedback between poverty, population growth, and 
degradation of the local natural resource base. 
However, neither poverty, nor population growth, nor 
environmental degradation is the prior cause of the 
others: over time each influences, and is in turn 
influenced by, the others. The two broad categories of 
positive feedback are able to coexist in a society 
because nutritional status doesn’t much affect 
fecundity, or so it has been found, except under 
conditions of extreme nutritional stress. (During the 
1974 famine in Bangladesh, deaths in excess of those 
that would have occurred under previous nutritional 
conditions numbered about 1.5 million. The stock was 
replenished within a year. Of course, 
undernourishment can still affect sexual reproduction 
through its implications for the frequency of stillbirths, 
age at menarche, failure to ovulate, maternal and 
infant mortality, and the frequency of sexual 
intercourse.) The interface of poverty, fertility, and the 
local natural resource base is accounted for in the 
section “Household Labor Needs and the Local 
Commons: The Population–Poverty–Resource Nexus,” 
below, and in Box 3. 
In speaking of an economy, this is casting a wide 
net. The economy could be a person, or it could be a 
household, a village, a district, a province, a nation, or 
even the whole world. Note, however, that a village 
could be in the grip of a poverty trap even if the 
country is not. It is frequently argued that, in such a 
situation, outside aid is needed if the villagers are to 
lift themselves out of the mire. (Of course, what form 
that aid should take is something that can only be 
identified when the positive feedback mechanism is 
well understood. Description alone doesn’t tell us what 
should be done.) But the context matters. It could be 
that what is needed more than aid is the creation of 
(rational) trust among people and (rational) 
confidence in the external world to honor agreements. 
  Those who are caught in poverty traps do not 
necessarily spiral down further. For most, there is little 
room below to fall into; many are already 
undernourished and susceptible to diseases. Modern 
nutrition science has shown that relatively low 
mortality rates can coexist with a high incidence of 
undernutrition and morbidity. To be sure, many die 
owing to causes directly traceable to their poverty. But 
large numbers continue to live under nutritional and 
environmental stresses. Moreover, people tend not to 
accept adverse circumstances lying down. So it is 
reasonable to assume that they try their best to 
improve their lot. There are, to be sure, situations 
where human responses to stress lead to successful 
outcomes. However, as this brief is about poverty 
traps, the idea is to identify conditions under which 
the coping mechanisms people adopt are not enough 
to lift them out of the mire. For example, one study 
shows that in the face of population pressure in 
Bangladesh, small landholders have periodically 
adopted new ways of doing things so as to intensify 
agricultural production. This, however, has resulted in 
only an imperceptible improvement in the standard of 
living, and a worsening of the ownership of land 
probably due to the prevalence of distress sales of 
land. Other researchers have observed that location 
per se, and not merely the local ecology, can matter. 
They note, for example, that to be landlocked and 
surrounded by poor neighbors reduces a country’s 
economic options that much more. 
The externalities associated with people’s coping 
strategies can amount to significant differences 
between private and social returns to various 
economic activities. Thus, where reproductive 
behavior is “pro-natalist,” the private returns to having 
large numbers of children are high, in contrast to the 
social returns. Similarly, where communities degrade 
their natural resource base, the collective endeavors 
to maintain the base are unable to withstand the 
pressure of private malfeasance. And so on.3 
Box 1—The Idea of Mutual Causation 
Mutual causation is at the center of Description. In 
order to formalize mutual causation and to show 
how cross-sectional data on poverty should be 
interpreted, consider a system that can be 
described at any moment of time t by three 
(scalar) variables X(t), Y(t), and Z(t). We call X, Y, 
and Z the state variables of the system. A system 
with three state variables was chosen because the 
discussion focuses on the possible links between 
poverty, population size, and the state of the 
natural resource base. 
Imagine that the process driving the system 
can be described by a triplet of deterministic 
differential equations:  
dX(t)/dt = E(X(t),Y(t),Z(t),q), (1) 
dY(t)/dt = F(X(t),Y(t),Z(t),q), and  (2) 
dZ(t)/dt = G(X(t),Y(t),Z(t),q), (3) 
where q is a (scalar) parameter and where E, F, 
and G are continuous functions of X, Y and Z. For 
simplicity of exposition, assume that X, Y, Z, and q 
are all observable. Notice first that the causal 
connection between X, Y, and Z is mutual: 
equations (1)–(3) say that, over time, each state 
variable influences the others. Time series of X, Y, 
and Z enable the econometrician to estimate E, F, 
and G. Data, however, are frequently cross-
sectional (for example, cross household, cross 
village, cross district, and cross country). It is 
customary to interpret such data by first assuming 
that each observation in the sample  
represents a stationary point of equations (1)–(3). 
A stationary point is a triplet of numbers (X, Y, Z) 
for which, 
E(X,Y,Z,q) = 0,  (4) 
F(X,Y,Z,q) = 0, and  (5) 
G(X,Y,Z,q) = 0.  (6) 
But X, Y, and Z are functions of q. Write them as 
X(q), Y(q), and Z(q). If the process defined by 
equations (1)–(3) has positive feedback, equations 
(4)–(6) can have multiple solutions for the same 
value of q. So, one possible scenario is that every 
observation in the data set (say, of size N) is 
associated with the same value of q but with a 
different stationary point (see Box 2). 
But q is observable. So now suppose that each 
observation in the data set has a distinct value of 
q. If N were very large, the sample values of q 
could be approximated by an interval of numbers. 
We could plot X(q), Y(q), and Z(q). We would 
discover that they “move together.” We would then 
say that they are correlated. Description involves 
this form of reasoning. 
It may be that X(q), Y(q), and Z(q) do not look like 
continuous functions. Values of q at which the 
functions jump are called bifurcations. Their 
presence would point to nonlinearities in the 
system defined by equations (1)–(3). These 
equations offer a timeless economic model with 
microfoundations that can be interpreted in terms 
of the stationary point (4)–(6). 
 
 
Nutrition, Health, and Human Productivity 
The energy required to maintain each human life is 
substantial: 60–75 percent of the energy intake of 
someone in nutrition balance goes toward 
maintenance, the remaining 40–25 percent is spent 
on "discretionary" activities (work and leisure 
activities). Maintenance requirements are like fixed 
costs. They lead to positive feedback and reflect a 
nonlinearity inherent in human metabolic pathways. 
The fixed costs can also be a reason for unequal 
food distribution within poor households. To 
illustrate, suppose that in order to balance nutrition, 
a person requires on average 2,500 kilocalories 
(kcal) of energy intake each day. A poor household 
of four, having access to, say, 5,500 kcal per day, 
would be at serious risk of extinction if food were 
distributed equally among members. Of course, an 
unequal distribution would place those receiving well 
below 2,500 kcal at a terrible risk, but it would offer 
the household a chance to survive. A rich household, 
in contrast, has no such dilemma: it can practice 
equality with impunity. This is an example of how 
the presence of fixed costs can make poverty a 
source of inequality. 
Why can’t the market mechanism be relied on to 
eliminate undernutrition? The reason is the large 
energy maintenance requirement for human 
functioning. It places the undernourished at a severe 
disadvantage in their ability to obtain food: the 
quality of work they are able to offer is inadequate 
for obtaining the food they require, if they are to 
improve their nutritional status. Notice the circularity 
in the argument, which is a telling sign that the 
causation is mutual. Over time undernourishment 
can be both a cause and consequence of someone 
falling into a poverty trap. Because 
undernourishment displays hysteresis (that is, the 
scars cannot be wiped out), such poverty can be 
dynastic: once a household falls into a poverty trap, 
it can prove especially hard for descendents to 
emerge out of it. It can be shown that assetless 
people are especially at risk of falling into a poverty 
trap if the economy is not especially rich and if the 
distribution of assets is highly unequal. If the 
distribution of nonhuman assets were made less 
unequal in the economy, the market for labor would 
function better. Of course, the key issue is access to 
nutrition and health care, not so much the 4 
distribution of assets. If safety nets are in place, 
they provide that access when all else fails. 
Much international attention has been given to 
saving lives in times of crises in poor countries. This 
is as it should be. International agencies have also 
paid attention to keeping children alive in normal 
times through public health measures, such as 
family planning counseling, immunization, and oral 
rehydration. This too is as it should be. That many 
poor countries fail to do either is not evidence that 
these problems are especially hard to solve. In fact, 
they are among the easier social problems: they can 
be fielded even though no major modification is 
made to the prevailing economic system. Much the 
harder problem, in intellectual design, political 
commitment, and administration, is to ensure that 
those who remain alive are healthy. It is also a 
problem whose solution brings no easily visible 
benefit. But the persistence of large-scale 
undernourishment, caused by inadequate diet and 
lack of sanitation and potable water, is a sure sign of 
economic backwardness. For example, the stunting 
of both cognitive and motor capacity is a prime 
hidden cost of energy deficiency and anemia among 
children and, at one step removed, among mothers. 
It affects learning and skill formation and thereby 
future productivity. The price is paid in later years, 
but it is paid.
 
Box 2—Nutrition-Based Poverty Trap 
To illustrate positive feedback, consider the following 
stylized example: 
Denote time by t. The present is t = 0. 
Consider a person whose health (that is, 
nutritional status) at t is denoted by a scalar 
index H(t). Let W(H(t)) be the flow of well-
being enjoyed by the person. Naturally, one 
would suppose that dW/dH > 0. Now let 
J(H,q) denote a person’s income, where q is, 
as in Box 1, a (scalar) parameter that reflects 
the person's environment (q is a scalar index 
of what is a vector of parameters). Assume 
that the curve J shifts vertically upward with 
increasing values of q. 
What might q reflect? It could reflect (1) factors that 
are exogenous to the economy, such as rainfall, and 
factors that are exogenous to the person but are 
endogenous to the economy, such as the following: 
(2) the effectiveness of property rights, (3) the 
extent to which government and communities have 
effective support programs in place, (4) the degree 
to which markets are open to the person, and (5) the 
person’s nonlabor assets (including education). To 
these, add (6) the extent to which the person has 
reasons to trust others, which may be the most 
important of all. 
Let R(H) denote the person’s nutrition 
requirement (expressed in units of income). J(H,q) 
and R(H) are taken to be continuous functions of H. 
Now imagine that a person’s health status, viewed as 
a stock, obeys the deterministic differential equation, 
dH(t)/dt = J(H(t),q)  
– R(H(t)),H3 > H(t) > H1, (7) 
and if, for any t', H(t') = H1 (resp., H3), then H(t) = 
H1 (resp., H3) for all t > t'. (H = H1 and H = H3 are 
called “absorbing barriers.” The constant that 
preserves dimensionality in equation (7) has been 
implicitly set equal to unity. 
  In equation (7), H is the state variable and q is a 
parameter. In Figure 1, J(H,q) and R(H) have been 
drawn so that they intersect once, at H2. 
(Maintenance costs are reflected in the fact that  
R > 0 even when H = H1.) Equation (7) possesses 
three stationary points (or equilibria): H1, H2, and H3. 
Of these, H2 is unstable, while H1 and H3 are stable. 
Notice also that a person whose initial nutritional 
status, H(0), is slightly in excess of H2 enjoys growth 
in well-being, while someone with H(0) slightly less 
than H2 is trapped in a deteriorating situation. In 
short, there are people in the neighborhood of H2 
who are similar but who face widely differing 
fortunes. Poverty traps give rise to horizontal 
inequity. 













Source: Devised by author. 
Suppose q decreases slightly, say, because of 
deteriorations in any of the six factors listed earlier. 
In that case the income schedule J(H,q) would 
experience a slight vertical drop. H2 would move 
slightly to the right, meaning that some people who 
were not facing a poverty trap would now do so. 
Such people are said to be vulnerable to shocks in q. 
Suppose instead that q were to increase. The income 
schedule J(H,q) would rise vertically (as in the 
broken curve), leading H2 to move to H2'. Fewer 
people would now be prey to the poverty trap. 
Moreover, if q were to rise sufficiently high, J(H,q) 
would not intersect R(H). In that case H3 would 
become the unique stationary point of the system. 
Interpretations (2)–(6) for q come into play now. 
They identify the various pathways by which poverty 
traps can be and, in some countries have been, 
eliminated. 
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Household Labor Needs and the Local 
Commons: The Population–Poverty–
Resource Nexus 
Among poor households in rural communities much 
labor is needed even for simple tasks. Moreover, 
many households lack access to the sources of 
domestic energy available to households in advanced 
industrial countries. Nor do they have water on tap. 
In semi-arid and arid regions, water supply is often 
not even close at hand, nor is fuelwood nearby when 
the forests recede. This means that the relative 
prices of alternative sources of energy and water 
faced by rural households in poor countries are quite 
different from those faced by households elsewhere. 
In addition to cultivating crops, caring for livestock, 
cooking food, and producing simple marketable 
products, household members may have to spend 
several hours a day fetching water and collecting 
fodder and wood. These complementary activities 
have to be undertaken on a daily basis if households 
are to survive. They imply that poor people face large 
fixed costs in running their households—though 
econometricians studying rural households rarely 
model fixed costs (Box 3). Labor productivity is low 
because manufactured capital and environmental 
resources are both scarce. From an early age (as 
early as six years), children in poor households in the 
poorest countries mind their siblings and domestic 
animals, fetch water, and collect fuelwood, dung (in 
the Indian subcontinent), and fodder. Mostly, they 
do not go to school. Not only are educational facilities 
in the typical rural school woefully inadequate, but 
also parents need their children’s labor. Children 
aged 10–15 years have been routinely observed to 
work at least as many hours as adult males. 
  The need for many hands can in principle lead to 
a destructive situation where parents don’t have to 
pay the full price of rearing their children but share 
such costs with their community. Since time 
immemorial, rural assets such as village ponds and 
water holes, threshing grounds, grazing fields, 
swidden fallows, and local forests and woodlands 
have typically been owned communally. As a 
proportion of total assets, the presence of such 
assets ranges widely across ecological zones. In India 
the local commons are most  prevalent in arid 
regions, mountain regions, and unirrigated areas; 
they are least  prevalent in humid regions and river 
valleys. The rationale for this is the human desire to 
reduce risks. Community ownership and control 
enable households in semi-arid regions to pool their 
risks. An almost immediate empirical corollary is that 
income inequalities are less where common-property 
resources are more prominent. Aggregate income is 
a different matter though, and the arid and mountain 
regions and unirrigated areas are the poorest. As 
would be expected, dependence on common-
property resources even within dry regions would 
appear to decline with increasing wealth across 
households. 
 
Box 3—The Village Commons and Household Size 
That increases in population put additional pressure 
on the local natural resource base is, no doubt, a 
banality; instead consider the reverse influence: the 
effect of a deterioration of the local natural resource 
base on desired household size. Villagers free-riding 
on the commons can impoverish households in such 
a way as to create an additional need for household 
labor. This in turn translates into demand for more 
surviving children, if having more children were the 
cheapest means of obtaining that additional labor. Of 
course, this is only one possibility. Another is that the 
recession of the commons impoverishes households 
in such a way that, at the margin, children become 
too costly, with the result that the number of 
surviving children declines. This box offers a formal 
account of both possibilities. The model enables us 
to identify parametric conditions under which the 
various outcomes would be expected to occur. The 
noncooperative village (that is, one where villagers 
free-ride on one another) is then compared with a 
cooperative one (that is, one where they collectively 
find ways to avoid free-riding). The model is 
timeless. Adjustments over time can then be 
analyzed in terms of comparative statics. 
The Single Household 
Consider an agriculture-based village economy 
consisting of N identical households. N is taken to be 
sufficiently large that the representative household’s 
size does not affect the economy. The model is 
deterministic. Household size is assumed to be a 
continuous variable, which is a way of acknowledging 
that realized household size is not a deterministic 
function of the size the household sets for itself as a 
target. Let n be the size of a household. Members 
contribute to production, but they also consume from 
household earnings. Inputs and outputs are aggregated, 
and it is assumed that household production possibilities 
are such that net income per household member, y(n), 
has the quadratic form 
y(n) = –a + bn – cn
2,  
where a, b, c > 0, and b
2 > 4ac. (8) 
The quadratic form enables certain crucial features of a 
subsistence economy to be captured in a simple way, 
thereby permitting conclusions to be easily drawn. For 
example, equation (8) presumes that there are fixed costs 
in running a household, which is altogether realistic: in 
order to survive, a household must complete so many 
chores on a daily basis (cleaning, farming, animal care, 
fetching water, collecting fuelwood, cooking raw 
ingredients, and so forth) that single-member households 
are not feasible. Equation (8) also presumes that when the 
household is large, the costs of adding numbers begin to 
overtake the additional income that is generated. This too 
is clearly correct. It follows from equation (8) that y(n) = 0 
at 
 n * = [b – (b
2 – 4ac)
1/2]/2c, and (9a)   6 
Box 3—Continued 
n** = [b + (b
2 – 4ac)
1/2]/2c. (9b) 
Note that n* is the fixed cost of maintaining a household, 
while n** is the environment’s carrying capacity. It is 
assumed that the household chooses its size so as to 
maximize net income per head. Let n denote the value of 
n at which y(n) attains its maximum, and let y denote the 
maximum. Then 
n = b/2c and  (10a)  
y =  –a + b
2/4c. (10b) 
In Figure 2, y(n) is depicted as the curve ABC, where B is 
the point (b/2c, –a + b
2/4c). 
Imagine now that the household faces an increase in 
resource scarcity, which can be interpreted in terms of 
receding forests and vanishing waterholes. The index of 
resource scarcity could then be the average distance from 
the village to the resource base. So, an increase in 
resource scarcity would mean, among other things, an 
increase in n*. But it would typically mean more. For 
example, equations (9a,b) tell us that the household 
would face an increase in resource scarcity if a, c, and a/c 
were to increase and b were to decline in such a way that 
n** declines. Note too that, in this case, both n and y 
would decline in equations (10a,b). The resulting y(n) is 
depicted as the curve A'B'C' in Figure 2. The increase in 
resource scarcity shifts the curve ABC to A'B'C'. 
Consider instead the case where a, b, and c each 
increase, but in such a way that n* and n increase, while 
n** and y decline. This is the kind of situation in which a 
household finds that its best strategy against local 
resource degradation is to increase its size, even though 
that will make it poorer. The resulting y(n) is depicted as 
the curve A"B"C" in Figure 2. In short, the increase in 
resource scarcity shifts the curve ABC to A"B"C". 
Figure 2—Household Income per Head as 
Function of Household Size 
Source: Devised by author. 
Social Equilibrium 
Now to construct an equilibrium of the village 
economy. The state of the local natural resource base 
is taken to be a function of the village population, 
written as M, and a, b, and c in equation (8) are 
assumed to be functions of M: a = a(M), b = b(M), 
and c = c(M). A symmetrical equilibrium of the village 
economy is characterized by M = Nn. That is, n and y 
are the solutions of 
n = b(Nn)/2c(Nn) and  (11a) 
y = –a(Nn) + [b(Nn)]
2/4c(Nn). (11b) 
It is assumed that a solution exists and that n > 1. 
The Optimum Village 
Consider next an optimizing village community. It 
would choose n so as to maximize  
  y(n) = –a(Nn) + b(Nn)n – c(Nn)n
2. (12) 
(It is assumed, without justification, that the 
optimum is symmetric in households.) Let n***  
be the optimum household size. Then n*** is the 
solution of 
[b(Nn) –2nc(Nn)] – N[a'(Nn)  
– nb'(Nn) + n
2c'(Nn)] = 0.   (13) 
A comparison of equations (11a) and (13) tells us 
that   n*** < n if 
 –  a'(Nn) + n[b'(Nn) – nc(Nn)] < 0.  (14) 
That is, if (14) holds, the village is overpopulated  
in social equilibrium. An alternative way of thinking 
about the matter would be to say that an 
institutional reform that reduces the “freedom of 
access” to the commons would lower fertility. Now 
(14) certainly holds if  
a', c' > 0 and b' < 0 at n = n. (15) 
But (14) holds also if 
  a', b', c' > 0, and 
  [ – a' + (bb'/2c) – (b
2c'/4c
2)] 
  <   0   a t   n = n. (16) 
The Effect of Increased Resource Scarcity 
Let us study the implications for equilibrium 
household size and the standard of living 
consequent upon small exogenous shifts in the 
functions a(M), b(M), and c(M). It is assumed that 
prior to the shifts, inequality (14) holds. The 
perturbations are taken to be sufficiently small so 
that (14) continues to hold in the new equilibrium. 
Consider first the case where the perturbation 
consists of small upward shifts in a(M) and c(M) 
and a small downward shift in b(M). Notice that if 
(15) holds, both n and y would be marginally 
smaller as a consequence of the perturbation. 
Intuitively this is what one would expect: a small 
increase in resource scarcity results in poorer, but 
smaller, households. Now consider the case where 
(16) holds. Suppose the perturbation consists of 
small upward shifts in each of the functions a(M), 
b(M), and c(M). The relative magnitudes of the 
shifts can be set so that the small increase in 
resource scarcity results in poorer, but larger, 
households; that is, y declines marginally but n 
increases marginally. This is the timeless 
counterpart of the positive feedback mechanism 
between population size, poverty, and degradation 
of the natural resource base. Such a feedback, 
while by no means an inevitable fact of rural life, is 
a possibility. The experiences of Sub-Saharan Africa 
and the northern Indian subcontinent in recent 
decades are not inconsistent with it. 
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In recent years, social norms that once 
regulated local resources have changed. The very 
process of economic development, as exemplified 
by urbanization and mobility, can erode traditional 
methods of control. Social norms are endangered 
also by civil strife and by the usurpation of 
resources by landowners or the state. For 
example, resource-allocation rules practiced at the 
local level have frequently been overturned by 
central fiat. A number of states in the Sahel 
imposed rules that in effect destroyed community 
management practices in the forests. Villages 
ceased to have authority to enforce sanctions 
against those who violated locally instituted rules 
of use. State authority turned the local commons 
into free-access resources. As social norms 
degrade, whatever the cause, parents pass some 
of the costs of children on to the community by 
overexploiting the commons. This is an instance of 
a demographic free-rider problem. 
The perception of an increase in the net 
benefits of having children induces households to 
have too many. This is predicted by the standard 
theory of the imperfectly managed commons. It is 
also true that when households are further 
impoverished owing to the erosion of the 
commons, the net cost of children increases (of 
course, household size continues to remain above 
what is desirable from the collective viewpoint). A 
study in Nepal, for example, found that increasing 
environmental scarcity lowered the demand for 
children, implying that the households in question 
perceived resource scarcity as increasing the cost 
of raising children. Apparently, increasing 
firewood and water scarcity in the villages in the 
sample didn’t have a strong enough effect on the 
relative productivity of child labor to induce higher 
demand for children, given the effects that work 
in the opposite direction. Environmental scarcity 
there acted as a check on population growth. 
However, theoretical considerations suggest 
that, in certain circumstances, increased resource 
scarcity induces further population growth. This 
statement is qualified because the theory has 
often been misunderstood to be saying that the 
negative link between (local) resource availability 
and fertility is unconditional. Bearing and raising 
children involve costs, but in some circumstances 
those costs are outweighed by the benefits of 
further procreation.  
As the community’s natural resources are 
depleted, households find themselves needing 
more “hands.” No doubt additional hands could be 
obtained if the adults worked even harder, but in 
many cultures it would not do for the men to 
gather fuelwood and fetch water for household 
use. No doubt, too, additional hands could be 
obtained if children at school were withdrawn and 
put to work. But, as we have seen, the children 
mostly don’t go to school anyway. In short, when 
all other sources of additional labor become too 
costly, more children are produced, thus further 
damaging the local resource base and, in turn, 
providing the household with an incentive to 
enlarge even more. This does not necessarily 
mean that the fertility rate will increase. If the 
infant mortality rate were to decline, there would 
be no need for more births in order for a 
household to acquire more hands. However, along 
this pathway, poverty, household size, and 
environmental degradation could reinforce one 
another. By the time some countervailing set of 
factors diminishes the benefits of having further 
children, many lives may have experienced a 
worsening of poverty (Box 3). A statistical analysis 
of evidence from villages in South Africa has 
found a positive link between fertility increase and 
environmental degradation, while a weak positive 
link has been found in the Sindh region in 
Pakistan. Over time the feedback would be 
expected to have political effects, as manifested 
by battles for scarce resources, for example, 
among competing ethnic groups. The latter 
connection deserves greater investigation than it 
has elicited so far. 
To be sure, families with greater access to 
resources would be in a position to limit their size 
and propel themselves into still higher income 
levels. Admittedly, too, people from the poorest of 
backgrounds have been known to improve their 
circumstances. Nevertheless, positive feedbacks 
are at work that pull households away from one 
another. Such forces enable extreme poverty to 
persist despite growth in the well-being of the rest 
of society. (For a formal account of the process by 
means of a timeless model, see Box 2.) 
Morals 
Poverty traps are a reality. They are symptomatic 
of essential nonlinearities in metabolic, 
environmental, and socioeconomic processes. 
Although poverty traps have no single source, 
they possess a common structure. A lack of 
discussion on the pathways leading to poverty 
traps has been a factor behind many policy 
failures. Since the purpose here is to stimulate 
discussion, not to draw policy conclusions, the 
following observations about poverty alleviation 
are purposely broad: 
1.   Poverty alleviation policies should be site 
specific. It is easy enough to say, “One 
size does not fit all”; it is a lot harder to 
pin down how the “sizes” should be 
designed. In some contexts, preventing 
local institutions from collapsing may be 
the right object of policy design; in 
others, the provision of classrooms allied 
to school meals may be the right 
immediate investment. 
2.  Complementarities matter. Offering 
hungry children classrooms (even 
teachers!) does not help much in creating 
human capital. 8 
3.   Be aware of mutual causation. The 
common belief that unequal distribution of 
assets is a source of poverty among the 
unfortunate should be augmented by the 
recognition that poverty itself can be a 
cause of inequality. 
4.   Be aware of unintended consequences. 
Improving market conditions in the 
neighborhood of villages (surely a good 
thing) can lead to deterioration of village 
institutions, which in turn can lead to 
deterioration in the circumstances of the 
poorest. 
5.   The local natural resource base matters. 
National accounts do not include an 
economy’s natural resource base. Policies 
built on economic models that do not 
contain natural capital are particularly 
dangerous because they can harm 
precisely those who are the objects of 
concern. 
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